One of the promising multimedia services is the mobile pay-TV service. Due to its wireless nature, mobile pay-TV is vulnerable to attacks especially during hand-off. In 2011, an efficient anonymous authentication protocol for mobile pay-TV is proposed. The authors claim that their scheme provides an anonymous authentication to users by preventing intruders from obtaining users' IDs during the mutual authentication between mobile subscribers and head end systems. However, after analysis, it was found that the scheme does not provide anonymous authentication and users can be easily tracked while using their anonymous identity. The scheme is also subject to denial of service attack. In this paper the deficiencies of the original scheme are demonstrated, and then a proposed improved scheme that eliminates these deficiencies is presented.
Introduction
With the increased integration of pay-TV and wireless communication, multimedia pay service plays an important role in mobile broadcast TV services [1] . As these services are usually delay-sensitive due to high mobility feature and frequent handoffs, a fast and secure authentication scheme for such mobile broadcast TV services should be developed.
In order to reduce the delay introduced by the high mobility features and frequent handoffs and guarantee a secure and convenient access of services by authorized subscribers, a secure access management mechanism is required. This access management is provided by a conditional access system (CAS). A typical model of CAS consists of two parts, a head end system and numerous receivers, and the model is comprised of several important components [2] , which include:  Subscriber Authorization/Management System (SAS/ SMS): subsystems responsible for subscriber authorization and management; its works including key management, user authentication, entitlement messages delivery, subscriber information management and rights management.  Receiver: a subscriber device with a CAS module used for access control. Several CASs have been proposed to guarantee a secure and convenient access of services by authorized subscribers. Many studies have classified these schemes into symmetrical key-based schemes and public keybased schemes.
Public key-based conditional access system [3] [4] [5] may realize privacy preservation and avoid communicating with a third party during the handoff process. These methods suffer the heavy computation burden. In [6] , a subscriber first has to register his subscriber information with a signature to a provider by applying public key cryptosystem. When a subscriber wants to subscribe to any programs, he uses his device to send a subscription message to the provider. The provider then sends a receipt with a signature for confirming this subscription to the subscriber. However, the scheme [6] only protects the customers' privacy, but not the provider's [2] . In [7] , an "e-ticket" scheme for the authentication of pay-TV system is proposed. The scheme employed an encrypted authentication message with a blind and anonymous signature based on RSA public key cryptosystem to do the
Review of the Chen's Scheme
The scheme proposed in [14] introduced an efficient and anonymous mutual authentication protocol that eliminates the high computational cost and prevents security attacks introduced in a previous related protocol [15] . There are four phases in Chen's scheme, which includes initialization, issue, subscription and hand-off Phase.
Initialization Phase
This phase is invoked whenever user U i registers to the subscribers' database server (DBS) of HES via Subscriber Authorization System and Subscriber Management System (SAS/SMS) and the DBS saves U i 's identity ID. Both U i and HES uses a set-top-box (STB) as a secure channel during this phase. The following steps are performed to complete this phase [14] : 1) U i chooses his ID i and pw i and generates a random number b for calculating . Then, U i submits ID i and PWB to the pay-TV system server S.
2) S checks the database whether his ID i is already in the database or not. If ID i is already in the database, S checks whether U i performs a re-registration or not. If U i performs a re-registration then S sets ID i 's registration number N = N + 1 and updates ID i and N in the database otherwise S suggests U i to choose another ID i . If ID i is not in the database then S sets N = 0 and stores values of ID i and N in the database.
3) S calculates K, UD, Q and K, UD, Q and R, where:
, where y is the secret key of the remote server stored in the hash function and x is the secret key of S. 
Issue Phase
Assume that U i 's mobile subscriber device (MS i ) asks a service R t and the HES performs this authentication process of issue phase for U i to obtain a right code i  .
The statements are described as follows: 1) U i enters his ID i and PW i in order to login for obtaining the service, MS i performs the following computations.  Calculates PWB and
to verify whether
 Generates a random number n i and calculates: 
as the authentication session key to get service of the pay-TV system.
Hand-Off Phase
When MS i moves to a new coverage area that older HES cannot support such that a hand-off occurs, MS i needs to performer-authentication without re-login. The statements are described as follows: 1) MS i performs the following computations:  Generates a random number n i and calculates:
Here T 1 is the current timestamp
2) HES receives the message at the timestamp T 2 and performs the following computations:
 Checks the validity of   
Security Analysis of Chen's Scheme es such 's scheme, there
In [14] the authors claim several security properti as anonymous service, mutual authentication, resisting replay attacks, resisting man-in-the-middle-attack, and forgery difficulty. However, in this section, it is shown that Chen's scheme vulnerable to man-in-the-middleattack which leads to DoS attack. It is al so found that the scheme does not provide anonymous service. The aforementioned weaknesses are presented in detail as follows.
Corrections to Chen's Scheme
Before we present the weakness of Chen are some mistakes in the scheme that should be corrected. In step 3 of the initialization phase (Section 2.1), the system server S calculates R using the following equation:
Here, y is a secret key of the remote se store 
As shown in Equations (2) and (3) 
S issues a smart card containing [K, R, Q] to A over a secure channel.
3) The attacker A reads R from its smart card and compute 
This allows the attacker to track MS i ; since i ID is a fixed value for each user U i .
ercepting message durin
2) The attacker A can also know the service that the MS i asked from HES by int t R m ro g the issue phase and extracting i R and i n f m m. Using these two values and the computed y , the attacker can compute i R as follows:
3) The attacker A can also know the right code i  by intercepting that used by MS i to access service m The scheme is subject to denial of service attack can be performed through method can be performed during the subscription and hand-off phases by applying man-in-the-middle attack as follows:
1) The attacker A intercept message m 2 during any of the two phases and extract:
respectively. 2) The attacker gene random session key rates a 1) The attacker uses a rogue HES to transmit messages using a high signal strength in order to force MS to discard the signal sent by the legitimate HES and roam with the rogue HES.
2) When MS i roam with the rogue HES, it needs to perform re-authentication without re-login by sending m 1 : , , , ,
Z C CID T n , where: , which prevents U i from getting the service of the pay-TV system.
Scheme
To withstand the above attacks, we pr scheme based on the original C lightweight modifications. The i duces few modifications to the four phases as follows.
Initialization Phase
As assumed in [14] , both S and its HESs share a secr key x. Both U i and HES us secure channel during this ph performed to complete this phase: 1) U i chooses his ID i and pw i and generates a random number b for calculating   k is generated using the secret key x which is only known to the server S and its HESs. 
Issue Phase
  i t i i R R h y n     1 CID h y  , ID i i i   1 1 C h P C n  . i i
is t h i i ID T
Here T he current timesta Sends t e messag m to HES:  
 Broadcasts the mutual authentication message     
4.4
When MS i moves to a new can 
Security and Performance Analysis
4 In e to user tracking and evaluates the performance this section, the security of the proposed improved scheme with respect to the resistanc denial of service attack is analyzed. This section also of the proposed scheme.
5.1
im acking by ensuring the anonymity feature of users. As discussed user by
. Resistance to User Tracking
The proposed proved scheme prevents user tr A form using his user thentication key ( A y ) to extract the IDs of other uses. The proposed scheme also preserves users' privacy by using pseudo identity, for each user using the hash of the is prevent an attacker au j i CID to identify users. This pseudo identity generated using a one-way function combined with the user authentication key, i y , and the user's previous
and is updated in each phase. So, ble to anticipate the messages of the user each phase which guarantees indistinguishability. Also the integrity of messages exchanged between use s and HES is guaranteed due to the use of timestamps and the HMAC of each message which is included with the sage. The HMAC value is computed using the user authentication key ( i y ) which is only known to U i and HES.
it is impossi r mes to Den l of Service Attack 5.
Resistance ia
As discussed in Section 3.3, Chen's scheme is subject to denial of service attack. The attacker can perform this attack because the integrity of message m 2 of the subscription and hand-off phases is not guaranteed. So, an attacker can easily modify i E or i F during the subscription or hand-off phases without being detected by U i which prevents him from getting the service f the pay-TV system. o ges exto the ai e n values and some modified values.
5.
In the proposed scheme, the integrity of messa changed between users and HES is guaranteed due use of timestamps and the HMAC of each message which is included with the message. The HMAC value is computed using the user authentication key, ( i y ) which is only known to U i and HES. This prevents the DoS attack that can be launched ag nst th Chen's scheme as described in Section 3.3. This also prevents the attacker from making an impersonation attack and replay attacks using the ope
Performance Analysis
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed scheme. To analyze the efficiency of the proposed scheme, the proposed scheme is compared with the Chen's scheme [14] . The efficiency of the proposed scheme is analyzed with the same metrics used in Chen's scheme analysis. We define the notation H t as the hash computation time and E t as the symmetric encryption/decryption time. The four phases of both the Chen's scheme and the proposed scheme are simulated and implemented Dual-Core CPU comparison between the 3 ption about extra 89 μs for the overhead, which is the t . Performance comparison.
using OpenSSL library [17] on an Intel at 2.30 GHz. Table 1 shows a Chen's scheme and the proposed scheme with respect to the hash computation time and the symmetric encryption/ decryption time. Note that we neglect the XOR operation since it is an extremely light-weight one. As shown in Table 1 , the proposed scheme takes the following extra operation for each phase:  It takes extra hash operations and more two symmetric encryption/decryption about extra 62 μs for the initialization phase.  It takes extra 6 hash operations and more four symmetric encryption/decryption about extra 81 μs for the issue phase.  It takes extra 6 hash operations and more four symmetric encryption/decryption about extra 81 μs for the subscription phase.  It takes extra 8 hash operations and more four symmetric encryption/decry hand-off phase. This indicates that the proposed scheme introduces a minor increase in computation cost to enhance the security of the original scheme.
Conclusion
Recently, an efficient anonymous authentication protocol for mobile pay-TV is proposed [14] . However, the heme is vulnerable to sc user tracking attack and denial of service attack. An improved scheme is proposed to prevent these two attacks by lightweight modifications and, hus, can be applied in environments requiring a high level of security. The improved scheme introduces a minor increase in computation overhead and maintains the Table 1   Phase Chen's Scheme Proposed Scheme
